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ACCELERATED INDUCTION-THE END OF THE
OLD FAST SHUFFLE:
GUTKNECHT v. UNITED STATES1
David Earl Gutknecht at the time he refused induction into the armed
forces was just another young person among a growing number who have
registered disenchantment with the present draft system in the United States.
He has since played a major role in upsetting the Selective Service System's
ability to exercise a "broad, roving authority, a type of administrative ab-
solutism not congenial to our law-making traditions." 2
Gutknecht registered with his local board and was classified I-A. After he
notified the local board of his student status, he was reclassified II-S. Over
a year later he informed the board that he was no longer a student and was re-
classified I-A. He also asked for an exemption as a conscientious objec-
tor. When this request was denied, his I-A classification was reaffirmed.
On October 16, 1967, during the appeal of that classification, Gutknecht,
in an expression of opposition to the Vietnam War, turned in his notice of
classification and registration certificate by leaving them on the steps of the
Federal Building in Minneapolis. 3 His appeal was denied on November 22,
1967, and five days later he was again notified of his I-A status. On De-
cember 20, 1967, Gutknecht was declared delinquent by his local board
pursuant to the Selective Service Regulations 4 for failure to comply with
duties imposed by the Military Selective Service Act.5 On December 26, only
six days later, he was ordered to report for induction. As a result of the
declaration of delinquency, Gutknecht's induction had been accelerated.
Gutknecht appeared at the induction center when scheduled, but refused
to take part in the processing. Subsequently he was indicted and prosecuted
under the Selective Service Act.7 Gutknecht, tried without a jury, was found
guilty of "wilfully and knowingly failing and neglecting 'to perform a duty
required of him' under the Act." He was sentenced to four years in pris-
1 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
2 Id. at 306.
3 Id. at 297.
4 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4 (1971).
5 50 U.S.C. § 462 (1964).
6 The Government conceded that it was unlikely that Gutknecht, at age 20, would
have been called at such an early date without the declaration of delinquency. 396 U.S.
at 317-18.
7 Section 12 of the Act calls for punishment by "imprisonment for not more than five
years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
.... " 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (Supp. V, 1970).
8 396 U.S. at 297.
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on. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. 9  The Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the conviction and held that the delinquency
provisions used to accelerate Gutknecht's induction were not authorized by
the Selective Service Act.
To understand and ascertain the role of delinquency in the Selective Serv-
ice System it is imperative that one acquaint oneself with the historical de-
velopment of enforcement within the System. The history of the Selective
Service System dates back to the Selective Draft Act of 1917.10 The Act
provided that a registrant was under the jurisdiction of the military courts
from the date he received his notice of induction," Those who were or-
dered to report for induction and failed to do so were apprehended and
dealt with according to the military laws proscribing desertion.' 2  The
utilization of the civilian legal process came into play only with regard to
conspiracies to obstruct the draft.'13 Under the 1917 Act enforcement was
primarily attained through the military while the local boards exercised a
reportorial function as to Draft Act violations.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,14 however, served to
severely limit the power of the military courts over the conscription process.
The Supreme Court in Billings v. Truesdell'5 held that the Act vested
jurisdiction solely in the civil courts from the time notice of induction was
received until the date of actual induction.' 6
The term "delinquent" was injected into selective service law in the regu-
lations issued pursuant to the 1940 Act.17 Basically, a delinquent was any
man required under the Act to register who failed to do so without a valid
excuse or any registrant who failed to perform any duty imposed on him
by the Selective Service System without a valid reason.' 8 Under the 1940
delinquency regulations, the board was to notify the delinquent and have
him report to the local board. The local board was still performing a re-
portorial function, for it was obligated to investigate the suspected delinquency
and if it determined that the delinquency was effected by wrongful intent,
the case was to be turned over to the United States Attorney. If the board
found that the delinquent was "innocent of any wrongful intent", it was to
process him as it would any other registrant.' 9
9 United States v. Gutknecht, 406 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969).
10 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
11 Id. § 2, 40 Stat. at 77-78.
12 United States ex rel. Bergdoll v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1939).
13 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
14 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
15 321 U.S. 542 (1944).
16 Id. at 546.
17 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20, Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295
(1970), citing 32 C.F.R. ch. VI (Supp. 1940).
18 Id., citing 32 C.F.R. § 601.106 (Supp. 1940).
19 Id. at 21, citing 32 C.F.R. § 603.390 (Supp. 1940).
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From 1940 to 1943 the local board served as an effective reporting de-
vice, but in 1943 the delinquency regulations were drastically changed. The
procedure of accelerated induction was introduced 20 "to provide for the ad-
ministrative penalty to a delinquent of prompt classification. . . for service,
in addition to the existing criminal sanction."21 An individual who was sub-
ject to conscription and failed to register was registered and classified as
available for service. The board was empowered to reclassify in a class
available for service and induct as soon as possible any registrant who failed
to perform a required duty, notwithstanding the order of call established in
the regulations.22  A registrant who lost an exemption or deferment under
the above procedure was granted the rights of appeal and personal appear-
ance.23  With respect to individuals who were already I-A when declared
delinquent, the local board had the option of "reopening" the classification
and granting appeal and personal appearance prior to induction. If the regis-
trant had become delinquent "knowingly", the board was ordered not to re-
open his classification.2 4 Thus, the result of the 1943 amendment was to
give to the local board the power to send a man into military service for a
violation of the law or regulations. This same summary power of the local
board survived both the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948,28
and the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.26
The local board's function in dealing with delinquents had thus developed
from a strictly reportorial one into a coercive induction process. In 1968, in
Oestereich v. Selective Service Board,27 the Supreme Court held that there
was no legislative authority to withhold a statutory exemption as a result
of conduct which in no way affected the merits of such an exemption. This
began a trend limiting the coercive power of the local boards. The reversal
of Gutknecht's conviction was a later and more significant manifestation of
that trend.
Actually, the decision in Gutknecht, holding that there is no legislative
authorization for induction of an individual inconsistent with his place in the
order of call, 28 is a logical extension of the rule handed down in Oestereich.
20 Id. at 23, citing 32 C.F.R. § 642.13(a) (Supp. 1943).
21 SELECTIVE SERvicE SYSTEM, ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAw 13,
56 (1950).
22 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 17, at 23, citing 32 C.F.R. § 642.13(a)
(Supp. 1943).
23 Id. at 23, citing 32 C.F.R. § 642.14 (Supp. 1943).
24 Id. at 24, citing 32 C.F.R. § 642.16(b) (Supp. 1943).
25 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari,
supra note 17, at 25, citing 32 C.F.R. Part 1642 (1948).
26 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-71 (Supp. V, 1970). At the time Gutknecht was declared
delinquent the local board had the power to declare a registrant delinquent for failure to
perform a duty required under Selective Service law. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1971);
See generally Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 17, at 17-25.
27 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
28 396 U.S. at 304-06.
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Therefore, similar to Oestereich, an administrative agency which acts at its
own discretion in withholding what can be a "bestowal of great benefits" 29
because of reasons that do not affect those benefits, will not be allowed to
continue to do so without congressional authority.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, was called upon to determine
the legality of the accelerated induction regulations enacted by the Selective
Service System. Several preliminary problems confronted him. He resolved
the first by observing that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies did not preclude the defense upon which the appeal was based; further,
he assumed rather than analyzed an element crucial to his determination of
the issue of intent-that the regulations were punitive rather than remedial.
Had the regulations been analyzed and found remedial, it is likely that, in
view of the broad powers given the President to enforce the Selective Serv-
ice Act, those regulations would have been found authorized. Finally, Jus-
tice Douglas not only held that no evidence had been presented to show that
Congress intended to legitimize accelerated induction, but in fact determined
that the legislature sought to limit tampering with the order of call.
Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed
separate concurring opinions.
Before the Court decided the case on the merits, it addressed itself to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The regulations provide
for appeal if the registrant "is classified in or reclassified into Class I-A,
Class I-A-O or Class I-0 . . ,,0 Justice Stewart, concurring, argued that
when Gutknecht was moved forward unnaturally in the order of call he was
"classified in" Class I-A within the meaning of the regulation, and appeal as
a matter of right was available to him. As the majority pointed out, how-
ever, delinquency status is declared and not classified.31 Therefore, the
Court held that a delinquent who has been moved ahead in the order of call
is not governed by the regulation and is only entitled to appeal at the dis-
cretion of his local board.32 Since there was no administrative appeal open
to the petitioner as a matter of right, he was not barred from raising the in-
validity of delinquency provisions in his defense.
The majority's conclusion that no administrative remedy was available to
Gutknecht was proper. A correct reading of the regulation leads one
to believe that "classified in", read with "reclassified into", would establish
that "classify in" refers to a registrant not previously classified at all.
The Court might well have made this distinction to show the discretionary
nature of delinquency provisions; it was not necessary to the defense.
In McKart v. United States,33 where the petitioner was challenging his I-A
29 Id. at 304.
30 32 C.F.R. § 1642.14 (1971).
31 396 U.S. at 300, citing 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4 (1967).
32 Id. at 300.
33 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
1971]
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
classification, the Court held that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was
inapplicable where the question raised was one of statutory interpretation. Jus-
tice Douglas, in a footnote, recognized the significance of McKart.
84
Clearly, that holding could have been applied to Gutknecht; the lack of
statutory authorization in the instant case is a question of statutory interpre-
tation.
Having assumed delinquency regulations leading to accelerated induction
are punitive in nature, the Supreme Court framed its decision around one
central issue: the legislative authorization of such regulations. The assump-
tion of the punitive nature of accelerated induction is tenuous at best and re-
quires deeper analysis. The Court found that the punitive accelerated induc-
tion procedure was not authorized by Congress. However, had the Court
found the procedure to be regulatory as opposed to punitive, it may well have
been authorized under the broad grant of authority given the President to en-
force the 1967 Act.8 5
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart suggested that provisions for ac-
celerated induction are part of a regulatory scheme and not punitive.80 If
indeed such is the case, the regulations must pass the tests set forth in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.37 Within the confines of this decision the Su-
preme Court established the basis for finding whether a certain procedure is
punitive in the absence of legislative history. The test is
[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point
in differing directions.38
It can be argued that induction into the military has characteristics of af-
firmative disability or restraint, but possibly the regulations would not be
classified punitive under this indicator since this change in status from civil-
ian to soldier is exactly what happens to registrants who are not character-
ized as delinquents. Induction itself, however, is not in issue. The real ques-
tion relating to affirmative restraint is the acceleration of induction. As a
result of a declaration of delinquency, a registrant suffers an affirmative dis-
ability. But for the accelerated induction, the inductee would have been able
to plan his education, his family life, and the solution of his personal obliga-
tions in reliance upon his expected induction date in the order of call. In fact,
84 396 U.S. at 300 n.3.
35 50 U.S.C. App. § 460 (1964), as amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (Supp. V,
1970).
36 396 U.S. at 314-19.
37 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
38 Id. at 168-69. (footnotes omitted).
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without accelerated induction some registrants would never be forced to
serve. It is apparent that a governmental scheme which precludes the plan-
ning of one's life beyond the immediate future effects a loss of personal lib-
erty.
The second criterion for finding an act punitive is whether historically it
has been regarded as punishment. A creature unique to the modem day
Selective Service System, accelerated induction lacks historical develop-
ment. Even though in the United States induction itself has been deemed an
honor or at least an accepted duty of citizenship, this factor of the Kennedy
test has little value as an indicator.
The third indicium of the penal nature of a provision is scienter. To say
that scienter is required in delinquency proceedings is an unprovable propo-
sition, for the local board is not required to make findings of fact but need
only express its decision by a classification symbol. The theory could be
advanced, however, that since the Act requires scienter for a finding of guilt
in a criminal prosecution for failure to perform a duty, 39 the local board
must pay heed, to some extent, to the registrant's intent. On the other hand,
the regulations do not require a knowing dereliction of duty, but only a vio-
lation of duty.40 The Government argued, in another context, that it would
be a breach of discretion on the part of the local board not to cure a delin-
quency incurred in good faith. 41 That may be so, but scienter is nowhere
required for the declaration of delinquency in the first instance. Despite
the Government's inadvertent admission, there is nothing determinative in an
analysis of this indicium.
The traditional aims of punishment are also achieved through the deterrent
effect of the acceleration process. Given the burdensome character of life
in the military and the peril to one's safety when in combat, it is natural that
many would wish to delay as long as possible or even avoid service alto-
gether.42  Therefore, the penalty of accelerated induction certainly deters
those who would otherwise avoid duties imposed by the Selective Service
System. The failure to provide for a delinquent's absolution save in the
local board's discretion permits the local board to accelerate induction for a
past act which a delinquent can in no way remedy, and contains elements of
both deterrence and retribution. Nor can it be denied that the behavior to
which the regulations apply is already a crime under section 12 of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act of 1967.
43
An important aspect of the Kennedy test which points away from the
punitive nature of accelerated induction is whether there is an alternative pur-
pose and whether in relation to that alternative, the regulation appears exces-
39 50 U.s.c. App. § 462 (Supp. V, 1970).
40 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1971).
41 396 U.S. at 301 n.4.
42 Brief for Respondent at 44, Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
43 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (Supp. V, 1970).
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sive. The alternative purpose assigned to accelerated induction is both ration-
al and non-excessive. The raising of an army is a valid constitutional goal.
The Selective Service System was put into effect to implement that goal.
The provision for accelerated induction compels cooperation with the Sys-
tem. If every minor breach of duty had to be prosecuted in the courts, the
Selective Service System would become overburdened at best and completely
ineffective at worst.44  Another non-punitive reason for accelerated induc-
tion is to keep up the morale of the many millions of registrants who attempt
in good faith to comply with the Selective Service Regulations. In fact, the
dissenters in Kennedy recognized that maintenance of morale of those in the
Armed Forces is a reasonable alternative purpose.45
The foregoing analysis does not clearly indicate whether or not delin-
quency is really punishment as set out in Kennedy. The application of the
test is not conclusive, but rather indicative of the nature of an act. In the
present application there is no clear indication one way or another. In
Anderson v. Hershey,46 the court concluded that depriving one of citizen-
ship, the sanction involved in Kennedy, is much harsher, and induction is
much less punishment.47
As the Government noted, regulation of licensing, deportation and dis-
barment, although having punitive aspects, has been consistently held reme-
dial. 48 Therefore, the Court could have found arguments to support the
proposition that delinquency provisions are regulatory. However, the Selec-
tive Service System itself recognized accelerated induction as punitive, label-
ing such a procedure an administrative penalty to be used "in addition to the
existing criminal sanction. '49  Perhaps this admission is the basis of the
Court's evasion of the issue. In any case, a better reading of the accelerated
induction provision in conjunction with the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez test
-- considering the loss of personal liberty effected and the element of de-
44 Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 47-49. Many thousands of men have been
declared delinquent for "minor" breaches of duty. Criminal prosecutions of all those
registrants would be a difficult task indeed.
45 Kennedy dealt with a denationalization statute invoked when one departed from or
remained outside the United States in time of war or national emergency in order to
avoid training and service in the armed forces; Gutknecht involved a conscription stat-
ute. They are not mutually exclusive. The dissenters in Kennedy felt that the use of
a denationalization statute was a valid effort by Congress to uphold the morale of men
who did not leave the United States to avoid their military obligations. 372 U.S. at
209-10.
46 410 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 47 (1970). The case was re-
manded in light of Breen v. Selective Service Bd., 396 U.S. 460 (1970), which relied to
some degree on Gutknecht. A reference to Anderson, therefore, is not inappropriate
in any critical analysis of Gutknecht.
47 410 F.2d at 498.
48 Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 59-61.
49 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 13, 56.
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terrent involved-leads to the conclusion that the purported regulations are,
in fact, punitive.
The Court's decision in Gutknecht, labelling the regulations as punitive,
can be questioned. Arguments can be advanced as to the regulatory nature
of delinquency. Yet the affirmative restraint involved appears to have been
too harsh for the Court to accept accelerated induction as regulatory. The
Court, by not even discussing why it considered the regulations punitive, sug-
gested that the punitive aspects of the provisions outweigh the regulatory as-
pects. The majority is in error by not discussing the remedial nature of
the regulations, because, even though its decision is supportable, the label-
ling of accelerated induction as punitive is by no means incontrovertible.
However, having found the delinquency provisions to be punitive as opposed
to remedial, the Court has preempted the argument that the delinquency pro-
visions may be deemed authorized pursuant to section 10 of the 1967 Act
allowing the President "to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions of this [Act]." 50
As the majority pointed out, "[d]eferment of the order of call may be the
bestowal of great benefits; and its acceleration may be extremely punitive." 51
Justice Douglas proceeded to the arguments surrounding the validity of the
procedure. The Court stated that although the delinquency regulations
have their basis in the Selective Service Act of 1948, the term delinquency
is not mentioned in the Act.52 Simply, the Court concluded that Congress
in 1948 did not expressly provide for accelerated induction of delinquents.5 3
The first and only statutory mention of delinquency comes in the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967 in a provision defining "prime age group" 54:
"[S]elections for induction into the Armed Forces are first to be made after
delinquents and volunteers." 55
Justice Douglas began his interpretation of the 1967 Act with the obser-
vation that Congress still had not addressed itself specifically to the delin-
quency issue.5" The Court stood on a solid foundation when arguing that
Congress intended to punish only under criminal law as set out in the Act;57
since accelerated induction is punishment, Congress has therefore impliedly
disapproved it. The House of Representatives, for example, wanted viola-
tions of draft law ascertained and quickly prosecuted. 58 The recommenda-
tion was made that draft violations be given priority on court docket sche-
50 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(1) (1964).
51 396 U.S. at 304.
52 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604.
53 396 U.S. at 307.
54 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
55 Id.
56 396 U.S. at 304-05.
57 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (Supp. V, 1970).
58 H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1967).
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dules.59
The House also expressed the intent that the order of call must be
conducted in an impartial manner. 0 The Court pointed to that section of
the House report indicating resistance to random selection. The House
sought to preserve the "oldest first" concept which was the basis of the existing
order of call, and in so doing manifested an intent to limit the President's
power to tamper.61 Accelerated induction, being inconsistent with the
"oldest first" rule was logically, therefore, an option not intended to be open
to the President.
A counter argument might be made that Congress implicitly recognized and
approved of the delinquency procedure of accelerated induction. The
House report, in discussing order of call, first made note of the one provision
on delinquency in the Act, and later recommended that in the area
of order of call, the President's discretion should be somewhat limited. 02
A reading of the two together suggests the argument that Congress did not
want wholesale tampering with the order of call, but impliedly recognized de-
linquency regulations as a possible exception. It should be noted, however,
that reading these two sections together requires taking one or the other
out of context.
Since Congress did not address itself specifically to accelerated induc-
tion, the most that reasonably can be said is that Congress had no manifest
intent with respect to delinquency provisions. If that is the case, it is this
negative proposition that supports the Gutknecht result. Since there was
no intent to authorize delinquency procedures, there is no actual statutory
basis for their legality.
The Court found more than just the defect of lack of authorization for the
delinquency provisions. Even if accelerated induction were permitted, there
would be no standards or guidelines to avoid the administrative absolutism so
incompatible with a free system of government.6 3 The Court in Kent v.
Dulles,6 4 for example, refused to allow the Secretary of State to exercise un-
bridled discretion in deciding to withhold a passport. It went on to state that
whenever
activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an Ameri-
can citizen, such as [the right to] travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly
all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. We hesitate to find in this broad
generalized power an authority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen.6 5
If the Court strictly construes a statute involving freedom of travel, one in-
volving accelerated induction in the military must also fall under such a
59 Id. at 46.
60 Id. at 28.
61 396 U.S. at 305, citing H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 9-10 (1967).
62 H.R. REP. No. 267, supra note 58, at 17, 43 (1967).
63 396 U.S. at 306.
64 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
65 Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
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strict construction rule. In Kent v. Dulles restraint of the right to travel was
involved. In Gutknecht the restriction is no less harsh. An accelerated in-
ductee is compelled to abandon his plans and repattem all of the elements of
his life, including, almost incidentally, the right to travel.
In addition, the local board's function is characterized by the same lack
of standards that was fatal to the Secretary of State in Kent. Prior to
Gutknecht a selective service registrant who inadvertently delayed in report-
ing a change of address, 66 or did not carry either his registration certificate 67
or classification notice at all times 8 violated a duty required by the Selec-
tive Service. Whenever a registrant failed to perform a duty, his local board
could (at its own discretion) declare him delinquent.6 9 Such a declaration led
in many cases to accelerated induction. Should the registrant have failed to
perform a minor duty such as those mentioned above, he could, at the dis-
cretion of his local board, suffer a severe loss of liberty.
The rule of strict construction as stated in Kent v. Dulles, must be applica-
ble to the case of one who, by exercise of delinquency procedures can be
forced into the military long before he might otherwise be required to go.
Realistically, the Court which announced the rule of Kent v. Dulles could
not allow an administrative system to exist which has no standards de-
scribing when the power of delinquency is to be exerted or what findings of
gravity, or wilfulness are relevant as to whether to declare a registrant de-
linquent.7 0 "The fault is in the absence of any standard or guide to the
evaluation of the importance of the omitted duty and the guilt-character of
the omission to perform it."71
The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of
Noel72 has indicated that where there is a longstanding established adminis-
trative procedure instituted pursuant to a statute which has been reenacted
many times, the procedure "is deemed to have received congressional ap-
proval and has the effect of law."
'73
The delinquency regulations were enacted in 1948 and are basically
the same as those in 1943. The inaction of Congress is even more ampli-
fied by the realization that from 1943 until the present, the Selective Service
Act has been either reenacted or revised in 1946, 1948, 1951 and
1967.74 Congress during this twenty-five year period neither revised nor
66 32 C.F.R. § 1641.3 (1971).
67 id. § 1617.1.
68 Id. § 1623.5.
69 Id. § 1642.4.
70 United States v. Eisdorfer, 299 F. Supp. 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
71 Id. at 988-89.
72 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
73 Id. at 682.
74 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 885), the conscription
statute in effect during World War 11, was expressly reenacted in 1946 except as
to specified provisions (Act of June 29, 1946, § 1, 60 Stat. 341). The 1946 Act
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questioned the validity of the delinquency provisions. There is weight to the
argument that congressional inaction as to delinquency implies approval of
those provisions. Estate of Noel does not stand alone; other cases similarly
hold that Congress, by reenacting a statute previously construed by an ad-
ministrative agency in a certain way, will be deemed to have accepted such
a construction3
5
The Gutknecht Court did not consider the doctrine of implied congres-
sional approval. Perhaps, had a substantial liberty not been at stake, the
concept would have played a more important role. The strict construction
doctrine of Kent v. Dulles, however, minimizes the importance of implied
intent. A logical extension of Kent, as applied to Gutknecht, might be that
Congress must expressly grant authority to an administrative agency that pur-
ports to restrict the freedom of an individual. Justice Douglas, while admit-
ting delinquency regulations as they now stand are an accepted and long es-
tablished feature of Selective Service, refused to ratify the provisions. The
Court, obviously feeling the necessity to strike down the provisions, would
not search out a way to uphold them.
The imposition of a punitive sanction requires certain procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the Constitution. 6 Justice Douglas, in finding these
regulations unauthorized, did not need to discuss the constitutional validity
of accelerated induction. However, he warned Congress that even if express
authority were given to delinquency provisions, they "would be subject to
the customary inquiries as to infirmities on their face . . . ,,77 Apparently,
punitive regulations, to be constitutionally valid, must include rights granted
a defendant in a criminal prosecution but presently denied a delinquent.
The constitutional rights which are denied the delinquent and guaranteed
to a defendant are numerous, and are dealt with in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The right to confront and
cross examine the witnesses against him is guaranteed to the defendant in a
criminal proceeding, 78 but the delinquency regulations provide for no such
right.79  Likewise, the Sixth Amendment provides that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor . 66"80 The delinquent does
expired by operation of law on March 31, 1947 (§ 7, 60 Stat. 342), but fifteen
months later Congress reactivated the draft with the enactment of the Selective
Service Act of 1948 on June 24 of that year (62 Stat. 604). In 1951, the 1948 Act
was broadly amended and redesignated the Universal Military Training and Service
Act (65 Stat. 75). In 1967, the Act was again substantively revised and renamed
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (81 Stat. 100).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 35 n.20.
75 NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951); Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333
U.S. 445 (1948).
76 Bucher v. Selective Serv. Bd., 421 F.2d 24, 30 (3d Cir. 1970).
77 396 U.S. at 307.
78 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
79 32 C.F.R. § 1642 (1971).
80 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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not enjoy this right, as the local board is invested with subpoena power s'
while the registrant is not. The Sixth Amendment further guarantees the
rights of counsel,8 2 public trial8 and a jury trial;84 all of which are cir-
cumvented by the delinquency proceeding. Thus had the Supreme Court
found the delinquency regulations to be authorized, it would have been faced
with the seemingly insurmountable task of justifying the circumvention of
constitutionally guaranteed safeguards in a proceeding culminating in the
imposition of severe punitive sanctions.
It can be seen that the Supreme Court in Gutknecht v. United States made
the logical choice based on the worth of the arguments that could have been,
and in fact were, presented. If it rightly found no authorization for the de-
linquency regulations, what of the concurring opinions of Justices Harlan and
Stewart? The former added only the observation that:
[Tihe President might promulgate new regulations, restricted in application to
cases in which a registrant fails to comply with a duty essential to the classifica-
tion process itself, that provide for accelerated induction under the existing stat-
ute.8 5
Justice Harlan saw the need to make the delinquency regulations analogous
to civil contempt, by providing a mechanism through which a registrant
facing accelerated induction would have the right to avoid any sanction by
future compliance.8 " While Justice Harlan concurred in the majority opin-
ion, he did not seem to limit its scope, but rather provided a suggestion for
a practical alternative procedure pertaining to delinquency provisions.
Justice Stewart agreed with the Court's result only because the petitioner
had merely five days,8 7 as opposed to thirty, to seek a personal appear-
ance and perfect an appeal. Having found it unnecessary to reach the ques-
tion of whether Congress has authorized the delinquency provisions, Justice
Stewart made the assertion that the delinquency regulations are remedial, and
that the entire procedure is analogous to the civil contempt theory.8 8 Al-
though both Justices Stewart and Harlan spoke of civil contempt, the lat-
ter recognized that under the present regulations the civil contempt theory
must fail. Under that theory the individual who suffers from its sanctions
had the conditional right to free himself from such sanctions by conforming
with the court's decree.
In his discussion of civil contempt, Justice Stewart took cognizance
of one of the respondent's arguments. While it is admitted that both a decla-
81 32 C.F.R. § 1621.15 (1971).
82 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84 Id.; Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
8G 396 U.S. at 313.
86 Id. at 313-14.
87 Id. at 314.
88 Id.
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ration of delinquency and removal therefrom are discretionary,89 the Jus-
tice seized upon the Government's argument:
[TIhe board would abuse its discretion if it refused such remedial relief [reopen-
ing and removal from delinquency status] to a registrant who breached his duty
inadvertently or carelessly, or who sought to correct the breach, even if originally
willful, and to return to compliance with his obligations.90
Apparently the Government offered the Court the proposition that the un-
fettered discretion of the local board to commit a man to involuntary con-
finement in the military is fine and just, for the unfettered discretion of the
local board is subject to review by the United States Attorney, who in turn
exercises a discretion free from any standard or guideline. Obviously the
Court would not accept an argument which would allow an administrative
agency to exercise a broad discretion checked only by another administra-
tive agency exercising the same degree of discretion.
The full range and scope of the Gutknecht decision cannot be fully ap-
preciated without recourse to recent cases applying the decision. Many
cases have been remanded for reconsideration in light of Gutknecht.9' It
is apparent from the decisions reported that the courts are not hesitant in
applying the decision, and do not go out of their way to distinguish Gutknecht
on the facts. There are two specific lines of cases which seem to have de-
veloped and delineated, to some degree, the scope and range of the Gut-
knecht decision.
The first line of cases established a presumption of accelerated induction
when the defendant has been inducted pursuant to delinquency regulations.
This theory has evolved from the Ninth Circuit case of United States v.
Thomas.92 Further, in United States v. McClintock,93 the showing required
to rebut the presumption was specified. The defendant in that case argued
that he was inducted pursuant to the delinquency regulations and thus invoked
the presumption of acceleration. The Government countered with the argu-
ment that the delinquent would have been inducted regardless of the declara-
tion of delinquency, and therefore no acceleration occurred. The court
found for the defendant:
The plaintiff could not show precisely how many men had been called earlier and
how many, not otherwise deferred, remained to be called after the date set for
the defendant's induction. Without such information it is impossible to come to a
certain conclusion regarding acceleration.
94
It is evident from the language of this case that the Gutknecht decision, as in-
89 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a), (c) (1971).
90 396 U.S. at 316.
91 Kolden v. Selective Serv. Bd., 397 U.S. 47 (1970); Troutman v. United States, 397
U.S. 48 (1970); Batiste v. United States, 397 U.S. 48 (1970); Peet v. United States,
399 U.S. 523 (1970).
92 422 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1970).
93 311 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
94 Id. at 1120-21.
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terpreted by the Thomas and McClintock courts, has saddled the Govern-
ment with an oppressive burden.
The second line of cases revolves around the retroactive application of
Gutknecht v. United States. It has been given retroactive application in
three situations arising from habeas corpus proceedings. In Bradley v.
Laird95. the defendant's court-martial was held invalid because, as a result
of Gutknecht, the defendant's acceleration into the army had been illegal.
In Andre v. Resor,96 the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus for re-
lease from the army because his induction had been accelerated pursuant
to the delinquency regulations. The court, in applying Gutknecht retroac-
tively, held the petitioner should be immediately discharged. 97 In United
States v. Kelly,98 the petitioner was successful in having his conviction for
refusal to comply with induction reversed.
The court in Kelly discussed the procedure for invoking retroactivity and
held Gutknecht was the type of holding which required its application.99
The test for such application can be gleaned from the case of Linkletter v.
Walker,100 and consists basically in analyzing the purpose of the new
rule, reliance by the police and the courts on the old rule and the effect
retroactive application will have on the administration of justice. As the
purpose of the rule is given the greatest weight in determining retroactive
application, 101 the courts have allowed such application with little or no
hesitancy in accelerated induction cases. The justification for giving
Gutknecht retroactive application can be seen from the following state-
ment:
Since delinquency induction was not authorized, the petitioner is in the army illeg-
ally. In view of this the factors of law enforcement reliance and administrative
convenience are entitled to almost no weight in the balancing process ... .102
Kelly holds that proper application of Gutknecht is a retroactive applica-
tion.' 03 The focus of Gutknecht is not with the facts leading to a conviction,
but rather that the trial should never have been held.10 4 When Gutknecht
is viewed in that light, no conviction based on refusal to submit to induction
after it had been accelerated can stand. The registrant is convicted for re-
fusing an induction which never should have been ordered.
There are thousands of men in the armed forces or in prison as a result of
accelerated induction pursuant to delinquency regulations. As to whether
95 315 F. Supp. 544 (D. Kan. 1970).
96 313 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
97 Id. at 958.
98 314 F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
99 Id. at 509.
100 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
101 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
102 Andre v. Resor, 313 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
103 314 F. Supp. at 510.
104 Id. at 509.
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any or all of these men will seek and obtain release based on a retroactive
application of Gutknecht, only time will tell, but the prospects look bright, for
Gutknecht truly marked the end of the old fast shuffle.
Jeffrey L. Glassman
Daniel E. Mintz
